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Technological advances have had profound effects on 
the conduct of military operations in both peacetime and in 
war.  One advance that has had a great impact outside the 
military by reducing human intervention is Voice 
Recognition (VR) technology.  This thesis will examine the 
implementation of a Voice Recognition System as a ship-
driving device and as a means of decreasing the occurrence 
of mishaps while reducing the level of fatigue of 
watchstanders on the bridge.  Chapter I will discuss the 
need for the United States Navy to investigate the 
implementation of a Voice Recognition System to help reduce 
the probability of mishaps occurring.  Chapter II will 
explain voice recognition technology, how it works, and how 
the proposed system can be fielded aboard U.S. Navy ships.  
Chapter III will examine the opinions (on the 
implementation of a Voice Recognition System) of officers 
charged with the safe navigation of naval ships.  Chapter 
IV will review the concerns of officers, and will justify 
the implementation by answering these concerns.  The 
conclusion will iterate the advances in voice recognition, 
and why a Voice Recognition system should be implemented on 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Throughout the history of the United States Navy, 
ships have been involved in collisions and groundings, and 
for as many years navy officials have spent time and money 
conducting investigations into why they occurred.  These 
detailed investigations first look into the ship’s 
surrounding setting.  For example, they look at the time of 
the incident, weather, sea state (a numerical or written 
description of sea roughness)1, visibility, position, and 
surrounding vessels.  The investigations then turn to the 
events that occurred on the ship’s bridge.  This portion of 
the investigation examines elements such as: the ship’s 
logs, the personnel on watch, the positions being manned, 
the experience level of each watch stander, and the amount 
of rest allowed between watches per person.  Great detail 
is rendered when investigating the elements on the ship’s 
bridge as the controlling aspects of the ship are directed 
from this station. According to an article in the 
January/March 2001 edition of Fathom Magazine, “Ninety-one 
percent of all mishaps reported to the Naval Safety Center 
are caused by human error.”2   These errors are due to a 
variety of reasons, but because the majority of mishaps 
occur due to human error, it can be argued that there is a 
need for improvement in the way ships are handled. 
 
                     1 John Noel and E.L. Beach, Naval Terms Dictionary, 1971. 3rd ed. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 
  1
2 Tom Binner, “ORM Corner: A Bad Year We Could Have Prevented,” 
Fathom Magazine, January-March 2001. 
B. SHIPHANDLING MISHAPS 
In the summer of 1997, an Afloat Mishap Report sent by 
a U.S. naval vessel to the Naval Safety Center demonstrated 
just how dangerous human error in shiphandling can be. 
At approx 1419, the stern mooring leg with the 10 
inch line was at 7 O’clock (210T).  The CO 
[Commanding Officer] and the Conning Officer were 
on the port bridge wing.  The OOD was in the 
pilot house.  The Conning Officer used a backing 
and twisting combination to back the ship into 
the current while walking the ship to stay in 
line with the prevailing current.  This maneuver 
was made to reduce strain on the 10 inch line so 
that it could be taken off the aft capstan and 
transferred to the port forward capstan.  At 
approx 1430Q forecastle and fantail crews stated 
they were ready to commence the shift and the 
strain was off the 10 inch line (now at 6 
O’clock).  The forecastle took up slack as the 
fantail removed the line from the capstan aft.  
Once the 10 inch line was clear of the port 
quarter chock, the conning officer started to 
twist the stern to the right, away from the 10 
inch line which now led forward up the port side.  
The ship began to rotate counter-clockwise.  As 
the Gulf Stream current started to catch the ship 
on its port side, conning orders were made to 
help offset the current.  The 10 inch line had a 
light to moderate strain.  As the buoy to the 10 
inch line approached 10 O’clock, the starboard 
shaft was to be brought briefly to ahead 2/3 to 
take the final momentum out of the ship’s swing.  
Shortly after the order, the forecastle reported 
heavy strain on the 10 inch line.  The buoy was 
at 11 O’clock about 1000 feet out.  Seconds 
later, the forecastle safety observer reported 
extremely heavy strain on the 10 inch line (two 
times).  Immediately after that (1435 Q), the 10 
inch line surged on the capstan approximately 50-
100 feet.  The forecastle safety observer said 
“Emergency stop, Emergency stop, Medical 
emergency” (at the time of mishap, engines were 
answering all back 2/3.)  The surge velocity 
  2
caused the 10 inch line to lift off the pile 
where it was faked down and whipped across the 
deck striking seven crew members.3    
Analysis of this incident found the number one cause 
of the event to be the human error in the conning commands.  
The report stated that probably because of high noise, the 
order given from the conning officer to the helmsman was 
reversed from ahead two-thirds to back two-thirds. And the 
repeat-back by the Lee Helmsman was not heard.  
There are many other types of mishaps that involve the 
deadly combination of ship driving and human error, 
specifically during close maneuvering situations such as 
underway replenishments.  Another Naval Mishap message4  
describes such an incident.  Two ships, an Underway 
Replenishment Oilier (AO) and a Combat Stores Ship (T-AFS) 
were running alongside each other when the Master Helmsman 
of the AO observed a gyro swing to starboard and applied 
left rudder in an attempt to correct the ship’s heading to 
base course.  After observing no change, he increased the 
rudder to left standard.  Still observing no change, the 
rudder command was increased to hard left. After this 
attempt, lack of rudder response was then reported as a 
loss of steering casualty and the helmsman shifted steering 
control to after steering.  At this time, the AO’s bow 
swung hard to port and was pointed at the T-AFS’s hull 
number.  The Conning Officer attempted to correct the swing 
with an order of hard right rudder.  With virtually no time 
for the correction command to take effect, the AO’s port 
                     3 Naval Safety Center, VA Naval Message, Subject: Afloat Mishap 
Report, 191600Z Jun 97. 
  3
4 Naval Safety Center, VA Naval Message, Subject: Afloat Mishap 
Report, 221257Z Aug 97. 
bow hit the T-AFS’s starboard bow.  Once again the 
prevailing factor that caused this incident was human 
error.  Had the Helmsman followed Standard Operating 
Procedures by requesting permission to use more than 10 
degrees of rudder to maintain the ordered course and called 
away the casualty upon the first indication of a steering 
failure, without attempting to correct it, this collision 
might have been avoided.  
As these two examples illustrate, it is clear that 
human error can cause casualties to personnel and costly 
damage to ships.  Situations such as these occur more 
frequently throughout the U.S. Navy than is acceptable.  
Although the mistakes in these events did not result in any 
fatalities, personnel were maimed, ships were heavily 
damaged, and the possibility for more extensive damage 
existed.  On September 15, 2000, Admiral Vern Clark, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, ordered a “safety standdown”--
the first since 1989--due to the fact that “there had been 
six major ship collisions over the previous 12 months.”5  An 
important question therefore needs to be answered: is there 
a way to improve the ship-driving link between the bridge 
watch standing personnel that give the standard commands 
and those people or systems who receive and execute them? 
 
C. WATCHSTANDING AND TECHNOLOGY 
Watch standing traditions were established long before 
the founding of the U.S. Navy, and sailors who have stood 
watch aboard ships have applied these traditions to the 
conduct of their watch station.  In today’s navy, watch 
                     
  4
5 Robert Burns, “Five months ago, concerns about at-sea mishaps led 
to ‘safety standdown’,” Stars and Stripes, 13 February 2001. 
standing traditions still survive, but many changes have 
been made in the way watch standers carry out their duties.  
A member of an engineering watch now has the added 
convenience of entering all vital engineering plant 
readings and data into hand-held computers that are then 
downloaded to a master program that generates all required 
engineering reports.  Operations Specialists and Weapons 
Technicians have newer and more advanced computers at their 
disposal allowing them to use touch-screen technology to 
conduct most of their watch standing duties.  And for a 
Quartermaster, the majority of navigational equipment is 
now computerized, providing more accurate and efficient 
means to do navigational plotting.  These changes in the 
way watches are conducted rest on the technological 
advances and innovations that flood the world today.  Yet 
with all the technology and dependency upon these advances, 
bridge watch stations remain “left out of the loop” as far 
as implementing effective technology that can change or 
enhance the ability of these watch standers to conduct 
their duties.     
  5
Technological advances in transportation, weapon 
systems and communications have had profound effects on the 
military and how it conducts operations in both peacetime 
and in war.  One advance not yet exploited by the navy on 
ships that has had great impact in reducing human 
intervention within the past few years is the Voice 
Recognition (VR) system.  A Voice Recognition system allows 
regularly spoken words to be communicated into a microphone 
and then converts these words into computer signals or 
commands.  Today, there are many uses for Voice Recognition 
systems.  They can be used for “dictation, personal 
computer interfaces, inventory maintenance, automated 
telephone services, special purpose industrial 
applications.”6  Also, students at the U.S. Naval Submarine 
School at Groton, Connecticut are now receiving training 
that is using a new harbor and channel ship-handling 
simulator called the Virtual Environment for Submarine ship 
handling and piloting training (VESUB).  With the VESUB, 
Lieutenant Commander Derek J. Rollinson, an instructor for 
the operations and navigation training department states: 
Voice recognition and synthesis software allows 
the student to interact with a computer-generated 
navigator, helmsman and the engineering officer 
of the watch.  The students can issue commands 
that the computer sub recognizes and responds to 
just as humans would.7 
Rear Admiral Richard D. West, Navigator of the Navy, 
in a recent interview by Fathom Magazine commented on the 
maritime implications of technological innovations such as 
voice-activated charts, electronic monitoring of 
engineering equipment, and auto pilot functionality; “Many 
commercial vessels now operate with one person on the 
bridge.  Obviously, the Navy’s requirements are much more 
demanding than those of commercial vessels, but I do 
foresee a significant reduction in bridge manning needs.”8   
Also, similar applications of voice recognition systems 
have undergone tests that will enable quadriplegic 
                     6 Timothy J. West, “Implementation and Evaluation of Commercial Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) Voice Recognition Software as an Input Device in a 
Windows-Type Environment” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
1996), 2. 
7 Maryann Lawlor, “Topside Training Submerges Students In Virtual 
Reality,” SIGNAL Magazine, July 2001. 
  6
8 Interview between Richard West, Rear Admiral, USN, Navigator of the 
Navy, and Fathom magazine, April-June, 2002. 
recreational sailors to independently control sailboats.  
In 1999, Todd Turner, an engineering student at the 
University of Calgary, and his team of three other students 
proposed as their final project for graduation a system 
that sailors could remotely control by adjusting both the 
sail and helm through a speech-recognition system.9   
Although this prototype VR project responded to 
approximately twenty percent of the commands given, in the 
technological realm, four year-old technology is considered 
outdated and has usually advanced exponentially since then. 
To help explain how rapidly technology is advancing, Gordon 
Moore, founder and chairman of Intel states that “for the 
past several decades, the number of transistors that can be 
placed on a single chip has approximately doubled every 18 
months owing to advances in manufacturing.”  He continues, 
“The effect has been a corresponding doubling of processing 
speed in instructions per second and memory capacity in 
bytes per chip, with a factor of 10 improvement about every 
5 years and a factor of 100 improvement every decade.  This 
phenomenon is called Moore’s law.”10         
With the increasing reliability in these systems, 
there is no reason why research and development should not 
be conducted to investigate the possibility of VR system 
installations on the bridges of naval ships.  The 
implementation of a VR system in conjunction with the 
existing Ship’s Control Console would provide a viable 
                     9 Mike Smith and others, “Voice-Recognition Controlled Sailboat: 
Speech-Recognition Control Aids Disabled Sailors,” Circuit Cellar, 
December 1999. Database on-line. Http://www.circuitcellar.com/online. 
Accessed 15 December, 2002. 
  7
10 Dorothy E. Denning, 2000. Information Warfare and Security, 
Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
option for the Conning Officer to execute the orders 
required to drive a naval vessel, and would reduce watch 
standing requirements. 
 
D. MANNING ISSUES 
Current manning on a ship’s bridge can consist of up 
to eight personnel: an Officer of the Deck (OOD), a Junior 
Officer of the Deck (JOOD), a Conning Officer (CONN), a 
Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch (BMOW), a Quartermaster of 
the Watch (QMOW), a Helmsman, a Lee Helmsman, and a Phone 
Talker.  There are many different combinations of manning 
that could be implemented with the integration of a VR 
system that would reduce the number of required watch 
standers and yet improve the safe operations of the ship.  
Two positions that could initially be eliminated with 
implementation of the VR system are the Helmsman and Lee 
Helmsman.  By eliminating the requirements to man these 
stations, the ship would be able to remove watch standers 
who routinely maintain heavy workloads (other than their 
watch standing duties) from the watch bill. 
Looking further into the current manning, it can be 
observed that there are two other watch standers on the 
bridge who are qualified to stand the positions of Helmsman 
and Lee Helmsman in the case of an emergency: the 
Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch and the Phone Talker.  Also, 
in most cases, the ship’s Quartermaster of the Watch is 
qualified as a Master Helmsman and Master Lee Helmsman. And 
at a minimum, a Quartermaster striker (an apprentice or 
learner),11 is qualified as Helmsman and Lee Helmsman.  
                     
  8
11 John Noel and E.L. Beach, Naval Terms Dictionary, 1971. 3rd ed. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 
Therefore, the majority of the bridge watch standers are 
either already qualified, or are working on their 
qualifications to stand watches as Helmsman and Lee 
Helmsman.  With reliable technology such as a VR system and 
the redundancy of watch stander qualifications, the two 
watch stations of Helmsman and Lee-Helmsman could be 
removed from the bridge watch bill. 
If ships are able to reduce their manning levels in 
conjunction with the implementation of a VR system, those 
watch standers remaining on the bridge watch bill must be 
qualified in the watch stations which would no longer be 
manned.  In the event of a casualty to the VR system, any 
member of the watch team would be able to respond so that 
immediate control of the Ship’s Control Console could be 
regained, and that person responding would maintain the 
position until a relief, as provided by casualty control 
procedures, arrived.   
According to Admiral Vern Clark in his “CNO Guidance 
for 2003,” “we [the Surface Navy] are enjoying now, the 
best manning I have witnessed in my career.  With few 
exceptions, we achieved C-212 manning status for all 
deploying battle group units at least six months prior to 
deployment.”13   In spite of this improving manning status 
however, many U.S. Navy ships in the fleet today continue 
to be undermanned with respect to their allocated manning 
levels and watch station requirements. Additionally, due to 
                     12 Status category that indicates a degree of readiness that reflects 
the unit possesses the resources and had accomplished the training 
necessary to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is 
organized or designed. 
  9
13 Admiral Vern Clark, “CNO Guidance for 2003: Achieving Sea Power 
21!” Database on-line. Http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/clark-
guidance2003.html. Accessed 24 January, 2003. 
life-cycle costs of manning ships, the navy continues to 
seek ways to further reduce manning requirements for watch 
stations. 
 
E. ADDRESSING CONCERNS 
The ship’s bridge is the one station that many 
Commanding Officers (CO’s) tend not to change for many 
reasons.  These reasons range from the time-honored 
traditions that are instilled in the conduct of the bridge 
watch station, to the pure and simple fact that Commanding 
Officers are reluctant to be the one that “makes the 
change.”  According to J. Robert Bost of Naval Sea Systems 
Command, “The greatest obstacle to reducing manning on U.S. 
Navy ships has been resistance to change in the U.S. Navy 
tradition which results from outmoded technology paradigms 
and organizational culture.”14   Commanding Officers feel 
some assurance that as long as they do not make drastic 
changes, they can attest to the fact that they were 
operating their ships within standard operating procedures 
if some type of mishap occurs.  The concerns of Commanding 
Officers need to be addressed to allow new technologies to 
be successfully introduced to navy ships.  Addressing these 
concerns will serve to improve not only the crew’s quality 
of life, but also contribute to a reduction of seamanship 
related mishaps. 
This work will review the question of whether a Voice 
Recognition system implemented as an alternative ship  
                     
  10
14 J. Robert Bost and others, “Is the Navy Serious about Reducing 
Manning on Its Ships?” 1999. Database on-line. 
Http://www.manningaffordability.com/S&tweb/Index_main.htm.  Accessed 24 
January, 2003. 
driving device would be an effective tool and if those 
responsible for driving navy ships would or would not use 
such a system.  By looking at VR technology and the 
implementation aboard a naval ship, the system’s advantages 
and disadvantages will confirm that an effective system can 
be installed onto a U.S. Navy ship.  In reaching a final 
conclusion, this work will review and evaluate the opinions 
of those personnel who have held the position of Commanding 
Officer, those who are currently Commanding Officers, and 
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II. VOICE RECOGNITION (VR) TECHNOLOGY 
A. WHAT IS VR? 
Voice Recognition (VR) technology research and 
development began in the early 1970’s with researchers at 
IBM Corporation and Carnegie Mellon University.  Since 
then, many companies and universities have contributed to 
the exponential advances of the Voice Recognition 
technology that exists today.  According to the IEEE 
Spectrum Online article, “Talk to the Machine,” Voice 
Recognition is “a truly interdisciplinary field, cutting 
across computer science, applied math, electrical 
engineering, linguistics, and cognitive science.”15   
Developers of VR systems have incorporated different 
applications to the technology, but Voice Recognition 
systems all operate in a similar fashion. 
When a voice signal is received by a microphone, the 
microphone converts the signal into an analog signal--much 
like the operation of a phone.  Then the analog signal is 
digitized and divided into very small segments of time, 
usually 10 or 20 milliseconds.  “Each frame is short enough 
so that its spectral properties are relatively fixed and 
long enough to capture at least one pitch period.”16   The 
system then captures the spectral features from these 
segments that it needs for recognition and disregards the 
remainder of the signal. 
                     15 Jean Kumagai, “Talk to the Machine,” IEEE Spectrum Online, 
September 2002. Database on-line. 
Http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/sep02/voic.html. 
Accessed 5 January, 2003. 
  13
16 Ibid. 
Voice Recognition technology today is still advancing 
as additional uses for the technology are developed.  
Computer system software developed by IBM’s ViaVoice PC 
comes with a library of about 150,000 words, which the user 
can expand, and hand-held Personal Data Assistants are now 
able to recognize up to several thousand words with devices 
as small as cellular phones recognizing up to a hundred 
words.17  Additionally, there are currently VR systems 
available on the market for purchase that allow you to 
manipulate items such as televisions, household lighting, 
stereo systems, etc.  Voice Recognition technology is the 
“wave of the future” that is breaking down the human-
machine communication barrier. 
In order for a Voice Recognition system to be able to 
recognize what is being said, the system must first have a 
list of words and phrases entered into the system’s data 
base.  These lists are usually identified as libraries.  In 
theory, Voice Recognition systems compare speech samples to 
data entered in these libraries and can be set up to match 
every known word, spoken in every accent, in every setting.  
But in order to have a system with all the capabilities 
described above, expectation of having real-time responses 
would be unrealistic.  Additionally, the amount of physical 
space necessary to hold all the memory required to maintain 
such a data base would be much larger than a desktop 
personal computer.  However, Voice Recognition systems can 
be set up to rely on tools known as language or grammar 
models that help reduce the data required to recognize 
signals.  Using these models, VR systems can be “taught” to 
recognize certain utterances in context.  For example, if 
                     
  14
17 Ibid. 
the speaker is asked for a phone number, the system will 
expect to hear a string of numbers. 
There are two types of voice recognition models in 
general usage; the grammar model and the language model. 
The grammar model has common application in the 
medical field and is used by doctors for transcribing 
patient records.  The speech engine only needs to recognize 
certain utterances in context.   
The language model is better suited for recognizing 
phrases relying on the tendencies of words occurring 
together.  For example, if the statement “Left Full” or 
“Right Full” is recognized, the likelihood of “Rudder” 
following “is nearly 100 percent.”18  In most cases, the 
system can recognize a signal midway because the 
probability of those signals occurring is so high.  And if 
the system does not find a match in the library, the system 
will ask the speaker to repeat the signal. 
 
B. PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION 
With the advanced level of today’s Voice Recognition 
technology, implementation of a language model VR system on 
a navy ship could occur immediately with existing VR 
products.  The Voice Recognition system devices (the 
system’s hardware) would be physically installed into the 
ship’s current Ship’s Control Console, ideally occupying 
the physical location of the Auto Pilot system, which would 
be removed with the implementation of the VR system.  With 
the Auto Pilot only capable of maintaining set courses, the 
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18 Ibid. 
VR system will be able to complete the same operations of 
the Auto Pilot in addition to featuring the additional VR 
capabilities.  The VR system would be connected 
electronically from the SCC to the engineering propulsion 
and steering systems for immediate responses to the Conning 
Officer’s orders.  The Conning Officer and Officer of the 
Deck would both be equipped with cordless microphone 
headsets that would have attached activation switches 
allowing navigational commands to be given on demand.  The 
activation switches would serve three main purposes. 
First, the VR system could identify which watch 
stander (the Conning Officer or the Officer of the Deck) 
was giving the command.  The system’s ability to identify 
who gives each command allows it to serve as a proprietary 
device for the Officer of the Deck.  If a command given by 
the Conning Officer is incorrect, the activation of the 
Officer of the Deck’s VR controls will override that of the 
Conning Officer’s, taking VR command precedence and 
enabling him or her to make the necessary standard order 
corrections.   
The second purpose of the activation switch is to 
ensure that other normal conversation or discussions about 
driving the ship would not confuse the VR system with 
signals that may be interpreted as actual commands.  
Frequently on the bridge of naval ships, the Officer of the 
Deck will discuss with the Conning Officer what the next 
maneuver may be and how the ship should be maneuvered into 
station.  These discussions may at times include the  
  16
identical verbiage for standard commands and therefore 
should not be heard by the VR system and confused as an 
actual standard command. 
Finally, the microphone switch will serve as an 
activation switch for an automated version of the Deck Log.  
The Deck Log is an “Official day-by-day record of a ship in 
commission and thus a legal document when signed.”19  It is 
a vital device for recording all engine and rudder orders.  
Each time the Conning Officer or Officer of the Deck 
activates the switch to give a standard command, the VR 
system will automatically send a signal to the automated 
Deck Log to record the command. 
In addition to the equipment mentioned above, the VR 
system would be equipped with a series of speakers 
installed throughout the ship’s bridge.  The purpose of the 
bridge speakers is to broadcast orders given by the Conning 
Officer as well as the repeat-back by the VR system.  This 
enables all bridge watch standers to hear the orders and 
repeat-backs, allowing them to maintain situational 
awareness as to how the ship is being driven and to 
anticipate the ship’s actual movements.  The speakers will 
also serve to provide a means for the VR system to repeat 
back the ordered command.  Standard operating procedures 
for all naval ships mandate that all rudder, course, and 
engine-order commands must be repeated by the Helmsman or 
Lee-Helmsman to ensure that the command is received 
correctly and understood. Many existing commercial VR 
systems use the repeat-back process to ensure correct 
signal reception. 
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19 John Noel and E.L. Beach, 1971. Naval Terms Dictionary, 3rd ed. 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 
It is also necessary to consider circumstances that 
would require a watch stander to assume manual control of 
the helm or lee helm.  This will be achieved by installing 
manual control switches throughout the bridge that override 
the VR system.  These switches will allow any bridge watch 
stander to disengage the VR system.  These manual control 
switches will be used in situations ranging from the 
Commanding Officer or Executive Officer arriving on the 
bridge and taking control of the ships maneuvering to 
responses to equipment casualties.  Many Commanding 
Officer’s Bridge Standing Orders make allowances for 
personnel that are not standing watch on the bridge to take 
the CONN under various scenarios and circumstances.  For 
example, according to the Commanding Officer’s Bridge 
Standing Orders aboard the USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), the 
CONN may be taken by the Commanding Officer at any time and 
by the Executive Officer (XO) at any time should he deem it 
necessary.20 
In addition, U.S. Navy ships have a standard set of 
immediate corrective responses that are initiated upon the 
alert of a casualty.  When responding to most engineering 
casualties, the first action is generally to take manual 
control of the ship’s engineering equipment.  This is done 
to reduce the potential of further damage and to allow 
operators to manually adjust equipment into normal 
operating parameters.  The same mentality must apply to the 
use of the VR system.  If a casualty occurs that may affect 
the Ship’s Control Console, i.e., propulsion, steering, 
fire, or in the case of General Quarters, the system must 
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22 September 2000. 
be able to be easily and promptly disengaged, returning the 
SCC helm and lee helm stations to manual control.  And if 
for no other reason than “something seems to be wrong,” 
there needs to be a way to bring total control back to the 
bridge watch standers and the SCC by assuming manual 
control.  
Finally, the VR system would be equipped with a status 
panel of system alarms and indicators that would be located 
on the Ship’s Control Console and in other easily viewed 
locations on the bridge.  The purpose for these status 
panels is to ensure that if any fault to the system 
occurred, corrective actions could be taken prior to a VR 
system failure.  Additionally, these panels would serve as 
both audible and visual alarm indicators displaying which 
element of the VR system failed. 
 
C. BRIDGE MANNING 
As discussed earlier, the implementation of the VR 
system would allow several changes to the underway bridge 
watch station.  Mandating that the Quarter Master of the 
Watch and Boatswain Mate of the Watch are qualified as 
Helmsman and Lee Helmsman, the watch station could consist 
of an Officer of the Deck, a Conning Officer, a 
Quartermaster of the Watch, a Boatswain’s Mate of the 
Watch, and the Phone Talker, thus reducing manning by two 
watch standers.  This manning organization on the bridge 
would allow the elimination of the Helmsman and Lee 
Helmsman, as the VR system would execute all helm and lee 
helm-related duties.  The Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch 
would conduct the duties of the helm and lee helm in 
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emergency cases.  Based on the current bridge manning (on a 
ship without a VR system) as discussed in Chapter I, the 
implementation of a Voice Recognition system would reduce 
the bridge watch station manning by twenty-five percent 
with no diminution of safe navigation. 
 
D. HOW IT WILL WORK 
All watch standers aboard ships are required to adhere 
to certain protocols in the conduct of their watches.  Each 
watchstander on the ship’s bridge and in Combat Information 
Center (CIC)21 contributes a specific skill-set to the 
combined effort of safe navigation.  The Quartermaster of 
the Watch relays all navigation and plotting information, 
the lookouts relay visual contact information, and the 
watch standers in CIC relay all tactical information to the 
bridge.  During the constant relay of information between 
various watch stations, the Officer of the Deck and Conning 
Officer determine how the ship is to be maneuvered in 
accordance with the operations being conducted and safe 
navigation.  From this determination, the most important 
information is passed: the standard commands22  from the 
Conning Officer to the Helmsman and Lee Helmsman. 
The passing of the standard commands is the most 
crucial element of ship driving.  If a mistake is made, 
either by the Conning Officer or the Helmsman or Lee 
Helmsman, the ship could be inadvertently driven into an 
unsafe situation.  Therefore each command given by the 
                     21 The section of the ship manned and equipped to collect and collate 
tactical information. 
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22 Official phrases used in such activities as gunfiring, 
shiphandling, etc. 
Conning Officer is repeated back to the Conning Officer 
verbatim by the Helm or Lee Helmsman, depending upon 
whether it is a rudder or engine order.  This 
acknowledgement is to ensure that all bridge watch standers 
know that the order was understood by the Helmsman or Lee 
Helmsman, and if the command was given or understood 
incorrectly, corrections can be made immediately after the 
mistake is recognized.  This also allows all those standing 
watch on the bridge to maintain situational awareness with 
regards to the maneuvers being conducted by the ship. 
In addition to the VR system repeat-back, the system 
will be electronically connected to all rudder angle and 
engine order indicators on the bridge, in CIC, in the 
Central Control Station, and in both the Executive and 
Commanding Officers cabins.  The rudder angle and engine 
order indicators allow the Conning Officer and Officer of 
the Deck to visually confirm that the standard command has 
been recognized correctly and that the steering and 
propulsion systems are responding properly. 
In order for the VR system to maintain the ordered 
course, a navigational/heading link into the VR system must 
enable the system to correlate courses ordered with the 
actual ship’s heading.  All U.S. naval ships are equipped 
with a combination of magnetic and gyro compasses.  These 
compasses are electrically connected to repeaters located 
throughout the ship providing gyro compass input to systems 
on a ship that require ship’s heading input to achieve 
particular missions.  For example, ship’s combat systems 
require the input provided by these compasses to assist in 
targeting, tracking, and weapons release.  By using the 
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same application of electrical input from the compasses to 
the VR system, the VR system will be able to effectively 
steer to and maintain ordered courses.         
Technically, the implementation of a Voice Recognition 
system is a sound and viable alternative for the safe 
navigation of a U.S. naval ship.  If the implementation of 
Voice Recognition systems on navy ships is to move forward, 
there is still one set of key stakeholders of the ship 
driving “system” that needs to be comfortable with the use 
of the VR system: the officers charged with the safe 
navigation and operation of navy ships.  
  22
III. OFFICER OPINIONS  
A. TECHNOLOGY VERSUS TRADITION 
Quite possibly the most important process when 
investigating the implementation of a Voice Recognition 
system into the Ship’s Control Console is to review the 
opinions of those officers who are charged with the safe 
navigation of the ship.  The technological advances 
provided by Voice Recognition can be the most reliable, 
sound, and effective system that easily processes the 
demanding signals used for this type of application, but if 
those responsible for the safe navigation of the ship are 
reluctant to use it, there is no need to proceed with an 
implementation of a VR system. 
Most U.S. naval ships are currently equipped with an 
Auto Pilot system that is installed in the SCC allowing the 
Helmsman to set a specific course which the Auto Pilot 
system maintains automatically.  The current Auto Pilot 
system has some similarity to the VR system as far as 
maintaining a “hands-free” ship’s heading, but Auto Pilot 
requires manual intervention to set and change courses.  In 
addition, there is no way of making speed changes without 
physically manipulating the engine-order telegraph23.  Many 
junior officers in the fleet have rarely experienced the 
use of the Auto Pilot system, and when used, it was only in 
open-ocean steaming situations with no other ships in close 
proximity.  In response to a survey consisting of questions 
regarding a Voice Recognition system, discussion turned to 
the use of this Auto Pilot system as a technological tool 
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23 Device on the ship’s bridge to give orders to the engine room.  
Also called Annuciator. 
to aid in driving a ship.  A lieutenant stated, “while on a 
DDG and FFG with auto pilots, it was rarely used and 
[generally] distrusted.”  However, “some mid-watch 
experimenting found the auto’s [sic] kept course very well 
under most situations.”24   The lieutenant also stated that 
when the Auto Pilot system was used, prior authorization 
from the Commanding Officer was necessary.  There are other 
accounts supporting the Auto Pilot’s reliability which 
state that the system worked well when used, but the 
respondents exhibited reluctance in allowing a “computer to 
drive the ship.”  The same lieutenant concluded by stating 
“We are beholden on Aegis Computers to effectively fight 
the ship, but we still don’t trust a computer to drive the 
ship under most circumstances.”25    
There are many reasons to be reluctant about relying 
upon new technologies and not to trust computer interaction 
when interconnected to driving a ship. One example of this 
happened as early as 1977 when the concept of an integrated 
bridge was tested on an FF 1052-class frigate, USS 
McCandless.  “The system worked well, and the ship asked to 
keep the new bridge.  Nevertheless, it was removed, and the 
old bridge reinstalled.”26   The reason for the removal of 
the integrated bridge may best be explained in the Naval 
Institute Proceedings article, “Losing the Horse-holders.”  
It states, “The greatest obstacle is resistance to 
                     24 E-mail message, 03 December 2002. 
25 Ibid. 
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26 J. Robert Bost and others, “Is the Navy Serious about Reducing 
Manning on Its Ships?” 1999. Database on-line. 
Http://www.manningaffordability.com/S&tweb/Index_main.htm.  Accessed 24 
January, 2003. 
change.”27   This chapter will examine several officers’ 
opinions to see if they would allow the use of a Voice 




In order to solicit officers opinions concerning the 
implementation of Voice Recognition, a questionnaire was 
developed that asked the simple question whether or not 
they would allow the use of such a system if they were the 
Commanding Officer of a ship.  The following questionnaire 
was sent throughout the fleet via electronic mail so that a 
random sampling of individuals was surveyed. 
Ladies and Gentlemen-fellow SWO’s, 
My name is LT Shawn Wilson and I am a student at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  I have sent this 
message to ask for your assistance with my 
research, which requires YOUR OPINION.  I know 
just how busy your schedule is, but if you could 
take 3-5 minutes to complete this your replies 
may possibly impact us all in the future.  Please 
feel free to respond either favorably or not to 
the question, but I do request you explain your 
answer briefly as there are both positive and 
negative answers.  Your reply is crucial to my 
research…please take the few moments to respond 
to the following questions and send it back to 
scwilson@nps.navy.mil.  I’d like to thank you in 
advance for your time and help. 
Very Respectfully, 
LT Shawn Wilson 
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27 J. Robert Bost and others, “Losing the Horse-holders,” U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, October 1995. 
  
Question: 
If you were the Commanding Officer of a Naval 
Vessel, and a voice activated/recognition system 
was installed in the Ship’s Control Console, 
which allowed the Conning staff to drive the ship 
and walk freely around the bridge area (wireless 
microphone system) while leaving the Helm station 
unmanned, would you allow it to be used?  If yes, 
under what conditions would you allow its use?  
If no, please explain why.  Are there other areas 




Are you an: 
Ensign – Lieutenant (01-03)? 
Lieutenant Commander or Senior (04 or higher)? 
 
Follow-on Questions: 
May I contact you if I have follow-on questions?28 
 
C. RESPONSES 
Responses to this questionnaire were received from 
officers (identities withheld) ranging in ranks from ensign 
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28 Shawn Wilson, Thesis Research Questionnaire. 28 October 2002. 
to captain who had varying levels of ship handling 
experience.  In all, 110 Responses were received.  A 
breakdown of responders is as follows: fourteen ensigns, 
nine lieutenants (junior grade), sixty-eight lieutenants, 
four lieutenant commanders, four commanders, and eleven 
captains.  Of these responders, seventy percent stated they 
would employ the VR system with varying restrictions (until 
proven reliable), ten percent gave full support to 
employing it with no restrictions, and twenty percent 
stated they would not allow use of such a system under 
their command.  Statistically, the majority of the officers 
that replied stated they would either fully employ the VR 
system or use the system only under certain circumstances 
until issues and concerns were addressed. 
According to a Destroyer Squadron Commander, the idea 
of automating the bridge and reducing manning levels had 
great merit if certain issues were addressed.  He stated:   
1)  Restrict use of the system to open-water 
maneuvering until reliability and accuracy of the 
Voice Activation system are established and 
proven. 
2)  The wireless system must be secure with 
regards to Electromagnetic Interference-hardening 
so that off-ship monitoring by nearby contacts 
could not use knowledge of maneuvering orders to 
gain a tactical advantage-not a small issue. 
3)  Some sort of audible summary alarm needs to 
be integrated into the system so that bridge 
watch standers would be alerted to a system 
failure, and know to take manual control.  Along 
with that, the manual control “take over” needs 
to be something that just a flip of a switch will 
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disengage the VR system for situations that range 
from the OOD to the Commanding Officer taking 
control of the Conn.  
4)  The system must be able to account for high 
ambient noise (wind, alarms, gunfire, etc.) as 
well as changes in Conning Officer voices caused 
by colds, moods, excitement, volume, etc.29  
The first and third issues that the Destroyer Squadron 
Commander raises are issues that deal with the physical 
characteristics of a VR system and the confidence that must 
be gained in any new system as it proves its reliability.  
Switches and other devices would be installed throughout 
the ship’s bridge to allow the watch stander to engage and 
disengage the system.  Any new system must be reliable and 
easy to use as its acceptance depends upon the comfort 
levels the Commanding Officer and those officers that stand 
the watches that will operate the VR system.  The second 
and fourth issues are more serious technical issues and 
require a great deal of consideration.  According to a navy 
commander, “wireless systems aboard ships carry serious 
vulnerabilities.”30   There are many concerns today with 
implementing wireless systems aboard naval ships that will 
be covered in the next chapter, and quite possibly the only 
reason to not consider the implementation of a VR system 
would be the existence of any insurmountable 
vulnerabilities of a wireless system. 
Many of the questionnaire responses stated the same 
concerns and allowances in the use of the Voice Recognition 
                     29 Interview between Destroyer Squadron Commander and the author, 02 
September 2002. 
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30 Telephone conversation between a commander in Information 
Assurance, and the author, 23 December 2002. 
system.    Most officers said that the system would be an 
excellent device used during open-ocean operations, but not 
for situations that required close proximity maneuvering.  
A lieutenant replied, “I would employ the system.” However: 
in underway evolutions such as UNREP [Underway 
Replenishment], Plane Guard, Sea & Anchor 
(restricted maneuvering) I would be inclined to 
have a manned station.  In considering such a 
system, I would carefully consider reliability, 
casualty procedures, back up systems, maintenance 
and training.  I would also consider how the 
system performs when a Conning Officer is 
performing during an emergency or under pressure 
when his voice characteristics may change 
considerably.31 
Another lieutenant stated, “I’d allow it to be used but 
only for trans-oceanic voyages and in low traffic density 
situations.  My concern with the system is that if the 
Conning Officer is wearing the mic, and the OOD need to 
take control, would he have a mic as well or would he have 
to take it from the Conning Officer?” Furthermore, he 
continued, “What if the CO or XO need to take emergency 
command of the conn?”32   One lieutenant gave full approval 
to the use of the VR system as long as “it had a fail-proof 
method of the CO/OOD/Navigator instantly being able to take 
the CONN even if they weren’t wearing a head set.”33    
  Although there is no “fail-proof” method for the 
Commanding Officer, Executive Officer or Navigator to take 
CONN instantly, the combination of the manual control 
switches and proper training for those standing watch on 
                     31 E-mail message, 04 December 2002. 
32 E-mail message, 04 December 2002. 
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33 E-mail message, 03 December 2002. 
the bridge to respond immediately to the assumption of the 
CONN will alleviate this concern.  Ensuring that qualified 
bridge watch standers are trained to take manual control of 
the SCC should it be necessary, the time lapse for the 
Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch to deactivate the VR system 
and assume manual control should last but a moment, or a 
“flip of a switch.”    
Other officer responses indicated that they would not 
consider using a Voice Recognition system for reasons 
ranging from time-honored traditions to complete distrust 
in allowing a computer to intervene with ship-driving.  A 
lieutenant (junior grade) said, “No, because having the 
human factor there and the delay (between the helmsman 
understanding and reacting) acts as a check in ensuring the 
proper command is given and received.  Plus there would be 
no way to check that the order was received correctly.”34   
Another lieutenant said:  
No, I would not use it.  I feel it is important 
that all bridge watch standers hear the commands 
as they are ordered.  Most QM1s [Quartermaster 
First Class] will not hesitate to tell a J.O. 
[Junior Officer] that he made a bad command.  
Such a system might encourage commands to be 
spoken at a lower volume which would prevent 
others from hearing them. 
He continues to explain his reluctance to the use of a VR 
system by adding: 
I like to know that I’ll receive an “Orders to 
the Helm” if I give an order that is clearly 
wrong.  We all know it’s a response that means 
more than, “I didn’t hear you” or that your order  
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was in the wrong format, or conflicting 
directions.  Good helmsmen use the response to 
imply you’re making an error.35  
Although there were some responses to the 
questionnaire that expressed unwavering opposition to the 
use of the system, the majority of the officers that 
replied were willing to use the system in the most relaxed 
situations, and were willing to increase the use based on 
the system’s proven reliability and effectiveness as well 
as the user’s “comfort level.”  Many of these questions and 
concerns that were stated in the officer opinions are valid 
and require attention.  In the next chapter, specific 
officer opinions and concerns, and further explanation of 
Voice Recognition systems capabilities and limitations will 
be addressed with respect to these opinions and concerns. 
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IV. OFFICER CONCERNS AND REMEDIES 
A. EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES 
As discussed in Chapter III, further examination of 
the VR system/user interface needs to be conducted to 
ensure that all questions and concerns are both answered 
and addressed before implementing the Voice Recognition 
system.  To ensure a successful introduction of the system, 
those bridge watch standers who drive the ships must be 
recognized as experts in ship driving, and must be used as 
vital resources in the proper development and 
implementation of such a system. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Destroyer 
Squadron Commander stressed four important issues: 1) 
Restrict use of the system until reliability and accuracy 
are proven, 2) Security of the wireless system to ensure no 
electromagnetic interference from both on and off the ship 
due to spoofing, 3) The need for a series of alarms and 
indicators to monitor the operation of the system, and 4) 
The system’s ability to filter ambient noise such as wind, 
alarms, gunfire, etc, as well changes in voices (giving the 
commands) caused by colds, moods, excitement, volume, etc.  




The issue of reliability was a common concern raised 
by all who responded.  Open-ocean steaming with no 
surrounding vessels (for many) would be the only time they 
would currently consider employing the system.  However, 
they were willing to consider the system’s use in more 
potentially hazardous situations such as mooring 
evolutions, underway replenishments, flight operations, and 
close aboard events, as the system itself is proven to be a 
reliable option to the manned SCC.  Aboard U.S. naval 
vessels, a certain level of trust must be attained before 
adoption of unfettered use of any tool, device, or system.  
The reason for such a demand in reliability is best stated 
by a lieutenant commander who said “It’s not worth the 
risk.”36  He continued [should an undetected VR system 
casualty occur], “In the worst case scenario, my JO’s were 
not as vigilant as they should have been, the ship veers 
off course and runs aground, the ship running aground 
causes a main space fire in which one or more of my crew 
are killed, resulting in a JAG [Judge Advocate General] 
investigation where I lose my command and career.”37  In the 
hypothetical situation described by this officer, many 
other oversights and mistakes occur after the undetected 
failure of the VR system, yet the first component he chose 
to blame for the grounding, fire, deaths, and the loss of 
his career was the use of a new technology that operated 
the rudders and engines of the ship.  Perhaps a re-
evaluation of the situation above would reveal that the 
“risk” was not in the use of the VR system, but in 
assignment of the watch standers who were not able to 
detect the ship deviating from the ordered course and into 
an unsafe condition.  As stated in “Is the Navy Serious 
about Reducing Manning on Its Ships,” “Taking risks is how  
                     36 E-mail message, 17 November 2002. 
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innovations are made and how the organization moves 
forward; The U.S. Navy needs to reward risk takers, even 
when they may fail.”38 
No matter to what extent an automated system’s 
reliability and effectiveness are proven, there is a 
culture that will continue to reject the use of a component 
that can play such an important role in the navigation of a 
ship.  Those who are willing to expand the use of the VR 
system will see that when a casualty occurs, corrective 
actions will eventually come naturally as is the case when 
learning any new system.  Just as the Destroyer Squadron 
Commander indicated, only time and repeated use will gain 
the confidence of those standing the watches of Conning 
Officer and Officer of the Deck, as well the Commanding 
Officers who put their trust and confidence in these watch 
standers. 
 
2. Security and Vulnerability 
The second issue that the destroyer squadron commander 
raised with respect to the implementation of a VR system is 
the security and vulnerabilities of a wireless system 
operating in a highly electromagnetic-active environment.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense issued a policy 
document for Pentagon Area Common Information Technology 
(IT) Wireless Security on 25 September, 2002.  Although the 
electromagnetic activity of land-based wireless networks or 
WLANs (Wireless Local Area Networks) differs from that on a  
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Manning on Its Ships?” 1999. Database on-line. 
Http://www.manningaffordability.com/S&tweb/Index_main.htm.  Accessed 24 
January, 2003. 
U.S. Navy ship, this policy possesses relevance to the 
importance of security for all government-associated 
Wireless Networks.   
The U.S. Navy does not yet have an IT wireless 
security policy developed for shipboard networks due to the 
infancy of wireless networks installed aboard navy ships.  
The Pentagon Area Common IT Wireless Security Policy states 
in its introduction, “Although wireless computing devices 
and infrastructure support systems can provide an increase 
in connectivity, they also provide an increase in security 
vulnerabilities and risks to DoD information and 
operations.”39   In order to ensure a secure wireless 
network (e.g., VR system, etc.), information passed 
throughout a wireless network must meet five Information 
Assurance (IA) axioms: 1) Confidentiality, 2) Integrity, 3) 
Authentication, 4) Nonrepudiation, and 5) Availability.  As 
defined in this policy, 
Confidentiality verifies that information is 
private and therefore seen and accessed only by 
intended recipients.  Confidentiality is created 
primarily through the use of protocols that use 
encryption.  Integrity verifies that information 
received is the same information transmitted by 
the originator, and is unchanged.  Authentication 
identifies an individual or computer to ensure 
access to information is authorized.  
Authentication goes hand-in-hand with 
identification and confidentiality.  
Nonrepudiation ensures that an individual cannot 
deny sending or receiving information.  
Availability ensures that information (voice, 
video, and data) and supporting service resources  
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(e.g., server, local networking infrastructures, 
and transport medium) are up and running when 
needed.40 
Based on the axioms listed above, the Pentagon’s wireless 
policy goals are: 
1. Protect DoD information, users, and wireless 
devices from unauthorized disclosure, 2. Ensure 
that DoD information is protected against an 
intrusion that could alter, disable, or 
circumvent the transmission, 3. Require 
centralized oversight, configuration management 
and control of wireless information systems, 4. 
Ensure protection against physical compromise 
(e.g., immediate notification of misplaced or 
missing DoD wireless devices to the appropriate 
authority), 5. Ensure user authentication of DoD 
information transferred via wireless computing 
devices, and 6. Ensure there will be no adverse 
impact to DoD critical operations if wireless 
computing devices and the supporting 
infrastructure are rendered inoperable.41 
Of these six goals, the first, second, and sixth hold the 
most importance, when considering VR system applications. 
The first goal discusses a need to assure no 
unauthorized disclosure of wireless systems transmissions.  
For obvious reasons, when using the VR system, there is a 
need to ensure that rudder and engine-order transmissions 
are not disclosed to areas surrounding the ship.  Just as 
the Destroyer Squadron Commander stated, “so that off-ship 
monitoring by nearby contacts could not use knowledge of 
maneuvering orders to gain a tactical advantage”42  
                     40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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42 Interview between Destroyer Squadron Commander and the author, 02 
September 2002. 
The second goal explains the importance of protecting 
the network from intrusion by unauthorized persons.  This 
is a crucial element of the VR system’s security, for if 
there were an intrusion, it could possibly maneuver the 
ship in ways that could drive it into a hazardous 
situation.  Even though manual control switches would be 
placed throughout the bridge, denying any attempt to take 
more than momentary control of the ships maneuvering, it is 
imperative that interference from unauthorized intrusion be 
obstructed. 
The sixth goal explains that if a casualty to the 
wireless system occurs, the system’s integrity must assure 
that there is no adverse impact that would render the 
system inoperable.  One major advantage to meeting this 
goal is that the navy relies heavily upon system 
redundancy.  Throughout navy ships, redundancy is critical 
to mission accomplishment.  By ensuring redundancy, U.S. 
Navy ships are capable of continued operations following 
damage from weapon attacks, groundings, collisions and 
fires.  By maintaining an operable SCC on the bridge with 
manual control switches, the VR system would not diminish 
the ability to maneuver the ship should a VR system 
casualty occur. 
In reviewing the Pentagon’s wireless security policy, 
it becomes apparent many concerns and goals of a land-based 
wireless network are identical to those of a ship-board 
wireless network.  Until a wireless network policy can be 
developed for ship-board networks, following the policy 
goals and objectives of the Pentagon Area Common IT  
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Wireless Security Policy would serve as a means to meeting 
the destroyer squadron commander’s concerns about network 
security. 
 
3. System Monitoring 
A third issue discussed the need for a series of 
alarms and indicators to monitor the operation of the 
system.  This concern was addressed in the proposed 
implementation section in Chapter II.  It is imperative to 
have these alarms and indicators for continuous monitoring 
of the VR system. 
 
4. System Fidelity 
The final concern of the Destroyer Squadron Commander 
was the VR system’s ability to filter ambient noise such as 
wind, alarms, gunfire, etc, as well changes in voices 
(giving the commands) caused by colds, moods, excitement, 
volume, etc.  As previously mentioned, language model Voice 
Recognition systems are designed with libraries of words 
and phrases that can be set up to match every known word, 
spoken in every accent, in every setting.  However, by 
limiting the words and phrases that need to be recognized 
by the VR system, every example of the words and phrases 
required for maneuvering ships could conceivably be entered 
into these libraries.  By entering only the words and 
phrases associated with standard commands, the VR system 
would be able to discriminate the intended commands with 
greater ease.  Also, by using the activation switch for the 
cordless microphone headsets, a substantial amount of 
ambient noise such as wind, alarms, gunfire, etc. would be 
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negligible due to the operator’s ability to activate the 
microphone when desired.  Additionally, according to 
Chicago-based speech consultant Judith Markowitz, 
“Thankfully, noise and speech frequencies travel 
differently.  You try to identify those frequencies that 
are moving differently from how you would expect speech to 
move,” she explains, “and then strip out a lot of that from 
the signal-a lot rather than everything, because some of 
those frequencies are also speech frequencies.”43   
Therefore, specific noises, such as wind, alarms, and 
gunfire can be measured ahead of time, making them easier 
to filter.  Finally, much can be said for the position and 
type of microphone used.  Ensuring that a high-quality 
microphone is pointed towards the operator’s mouth will 
assist in blocking out any ambient noise by receiving 
signals primarily from the users voice. 
 
B. SUMMARY 
The majority of the officers that stated they would 
use the VR system under certain restrictions expressed many 
of the same issues and concerns that were raised by the 
Destroyer Squadron Commander.  Surface Warfare Officers are 
taught from the onset of their training (in ship driving) 
to consider all possible events and casualties that may 
occur during their watch, and how to respond to these 
events and casualties.  Therefore, it is not unusual to see 
similarities in the way these officers evaluated the idea 
of a VR system.  From the perspective of a Surface Warfare 
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43 Jean Kumagai, “Talk to the Machine,” IEEE Spectrum Online, 
September 2002. Database on-line. 
Http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/sep02/voic.html. 
Accessed 5 January, 2003. 
Officer, the basic design requirements needed for the VR 
system to be accepted and used by those responsible for 
safe navigation are: correct and secure information 
exchange with proper system relay to both propulsion and 
steering mechanisms.  With the Voice Recognition system’s 
achievement of these requirements, smooth and efficient 

























The capability and reliability of Voice Recognition 
technology is ever-growing.  With more attention and 
implementation into the world’s common operating devices, 
this technology will continue to develop.  According to a 
statement by Victor Zue, director of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s (MIT’s) Laboratory for Computer 
Science, “I think of the next frontier as one in which 
machines are really not a device that you program, but a 
partner in conversation-you talk to it, it understands you, 
and it will try to do things for you.”44  This statement 
makes it is clear that in order to maintain the most 
technologically advanced naval vessels, it is imperative to 
further investigate, develop and field Voice Recognition 
systems aboard all U.S. Navy ships. 
As technology continues to improve, it is only a 
matter of time before Voice Recognition or command systems 
are part of everyday life.  Automobile manufacturers today 
are rapidly integrating this technology into the operation 
and navigation of their vehicles.  In a recent commercial 
for the Honda Accord (February 2, 2003), the driver is 
depicted operating the climate control, radio, and 
windshield wiper systems through Voice Recognition in 
addition to talking to the car’s Global Positioning System 
to access directions to a specific address.  This new 
element to everyday life will soon impact society with an 
electricity similar to that of the introduction of 
personnel computers, personnel data assistants (PDA’s), 
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cellular phones, and the internet.  Had these devices not 
been developed, daily routines for people throughout the 
world would be considerably different than what they are 
today.  Soon this same point of view will be expressed for 
Voice Recognition systems. 
Daily routines will be forever changed with the 
implementation of VR systems.  When pulling into the 
driveway of a house, people will only need to give the 
command “open garage door” to activate the door opener, and 
when walking through the house, commands such as “lights 
on” and “air conditioning, seventy-two” will turn on the 
lights and lower or raise the room temperature to seventy-
two degrees.  Just as sending and checking for e-mail 
messages has become a common every day activity for many, 
so will the use of Voice Recognition systems. 
With the future commonality of Voice Recognition use, 
it is clear that this technology aboard U.S. Navy ships 
will not be considered futuristic, but more of a common 
application; as if it were always expected to be a part of 
these ships.  Systems aboard U.S. Navy ships must always 
maintain pace with the latest technologies and be 
considered to be on the cutting edge of the country’s 
military systems.  In order to continue to advance with 
U.S. naval ship applications and systems, there is a need 
to continuously develop and research the “next step” in 
technology.  As revealed in the Officer’s Opinion chapter, 
it is clear that the majority of those who take the 
responsibility of the safe navigation and maneuvering of 
navy ships encourage the idea of Voice Recognition as an 
alternative to the currently manned SCC.  Voice Recognition 
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is the next significant technological advancement that will 
affect humankind.  It is imperative that the United States 
Navy conduct the necessary research and development to 
implement Voice Recognition systems as a reliable and 
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